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Purpose – This paper complements earlier studies on ethnic minority underdevelopment in 
Vietnam by empirically examining the ethnic wage gap in the Vietnamese labour market, using 
data from a large-scale household survey conducted in 2002. 
Methodology – The paper uses the ‘index number’ decomposition method suggested by 
Oaxaca (1973) to decompose the ethnic wage gap into treatment and endowment effects at 
both the mean and at selected quantiles of the conditional wage distribution. 
Findings – The results confirm the existence of an ethnic wage gap in the labour market, 
through this gap is found to be substantially narrower than the ethnic gap observed using 
household living standard measures for Vietnam. Decomposition results reveal that the ethnic 
wage gap is largely attributable to differentials in the returns to endowments, a finding 
invariant to whether the mean or selected quantiles of the conditional wage distribution is 
examined.    
Limitations – In the absence of superior alternatives, the paper uses an ad hoc procedure to 
correct for selectivity into wage employment for the quantile regression models.  In addition, 
due to data constraints in regard to earnings, the paper does not examine the ethnic wage gap 
for the self-employed.  
Originality – This paper is the first to analyse the ethnic wage gap in the Vietnam labour 
market and one of the few to examine ethnic pay differentials at selected points of the 
conditional wage distribution using quantile regression analysis.   
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1. Introduction 
Vietnam is a multi-ethnic country comprising about 54 ethnic groups. The largest group is the 
Kinh, which accounts for nearly 84 percent of the total population. The other 53 ethnic 
minorities range from some populous groups of around one million (such as the Tay, Thai, 
Muong, Khmer) to some smaller groups with populations measured in their hundreds (see 
Dang et al. 2000). The country as a whole has registered impressive progress in terms of 
overall poverty reduction over the past two decades.  However, poverty is still widespread 
within the ethnic minority groups. Between 1993 and 2004, the national poverty headcount fell 
by nearly two-thirds (from 58 percent to 19.5 percent), while ethnic minority poverty decreased 
by less than one-third (from 86.4 percent to 60.7 percent). Furthermore, the gap in living 
standards between, on the one hand, the Kinh majority and Hoa (the Chinese), and on the 
other, the remaining ethnic minorities has grown over time (Baulch et al., 2004). More 
worryingly, recent evidence demonstrates that hunger among ethnic minorities remains 
widespread, even when located in those parts of the country enjoying rapid economic growth 
(Swinkels and Turk, 2006).  
Previous studies on ethnic under-development in Vietnam have attempted to investigate this 
gap through examining differences in endowment (i.e., characteristics) and treatment (i.e., 
returns to characteristics) effects between the majority (Kinh and Chinese) and the other ethnic 
minority groups using household welfare measures.  The differences in both components are 
found to favour the Kinh and Chinese (Van de Walle and Gunewardana, 2001; Baulch et al., 
2004).  Though the poor endowment of the ethnic minority groups can be linked to the fact that 
most ethnic minorities reside in remote and mountainous areas, this explains only part of the 
gap. Baulch et al. (2004) report that “[…] even if ethnic minority households had the same 
endowments as the Kinh and Hoa (Kinh majority and the Chinese), this would close no more 
than a third of the gap in their living standards” (p. 274). This suggests that the ethnic 
minorities secure considerably lower returns to their characteristics than the majority.   
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Instead of investigating the gap in living standards between the majority and minority at the 
household-level, the current paper adds to a modest literature on ethnic disadvantage in 
Vietnam by empirically examining the nature and extent of ethnic labour market wage 
differentials at the level of the individual.  We believe this emphasis is apposite given that 
those in wage employment in the Vietnamese labour market accounted for about 28 percent of 
total employment in 2002.  In addition, the waged labour market is likely to become a more 
important institution as Vietnamese economic development proceeds.  
Our primary research theme will be investigated using both mean and quantile regression 
analysis.  In contrast to the mean regression approach, which sheds important light on the 
magnitude of the ethnic wage gap at the average, the use of quantile regression techniques 
provides insights on how the ethnic wage gap varies across the conditional wage distribution. 
The structure of this paper is now outlined. The next section provides some background to the 
ethnic wage gap and describes the data used in this study. It is followed by a description of the 
empirical methodology employed to decompose the ethnic wage gap at the mean and selected 
quantiles of the conditional wage distribution. The empirical results from this decomposition 
are discussed in section four. Conclusions and some policy implications are provided in the 
final section of the paper. 
2. Background and Data 
2.1 Data 
This paper draws on data from the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey 2002 
(hereafter VHLSS 2002), the third in the series of living standard measurement surveys 
undertaken for Vietnam to date. This survey series is conducted by the General Statistic Office 
(GSO) of Vietnam, under the technical guidance of the World Bank, with funding from the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Swedish International Development 
Agency (Sida). The overall approach adopted in these surveys is compliant with the framework 
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used in the World Bank’s Living Standard Measurement Surveys. These surveys are widely 
recognized as of high quality and nationally representative. 
The first two surveys, which are commonly referred to as the VLSS 1992/93 and VLSS 
1997/98, were undertaken using samples of 4,800 and 6,000 households respectively (see 
World Bank, 2000 and 2001 for more details). Although these surveys have been widely used 
to explore the impact of the Vietnamese reform process of Doi moi, they possess the drawback 
of having relatively small sample sizes. This was a primary motive for the introduction of the 
second phase of household surveys in 2002 designed to cover the period 2002 – 2010. The first 
survey of this second phase, the VHLSS 2002, collected information from a sample of 30,000 
households. However, this relatively large sample size combined with less technical support 
from donors than was the case for the two earlier surveys represented a technical challenge for 
the GSO resulting in problems with the administration and commune coverage of the survey 
[1].    Given the large administrative costs incurred and the potential for non-sampling errors in 
the implementation of VHLSS 2002, the sample size used in the subsequent survey in 2004 
was restricted to about 9,000 households (see Phung and Nguyen, 2006 for more details).      
In spite of some potential limitations in terms of its coverage, the VHLSS 2002 is selected for 
this study primarily because it contains a relatively large sample size. In the other surveys 
conducted, the ethnic minority wage workers comprise relatively small sub-samples (i.e., 239 
in the VLSS 1992/93, 289 in the VLSS 1997/98, and 349 in the VHLSS 2004). However, a 
sub-sample of 968 ethnic minority wage earners out of a total sample of 16,170 is available for 
the VHLSS 2002. This provides a feasible sub-sample of wage employees for a meaningful 
analysis of the ethnic wage gap [2].  The sample size is also important given our focus on 
investigating, inter alia, wage gaps at selected quantiles of the conditional wage distribution. 
Aside from information on various aspects of household well-being and a detailed array of 
household-level characteristics, the survey also provides detailed individual-level labour 
market information including data on earnings, hours worked, educational attainment, age, 
employment sector, and location.  
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2.2  Overview of the Ethnic Wage Gap in Vietnam 
The nature and scale of ethnic minority wage employment in Vietnam remains partly linked to 
the government’s erstwhile manpower allocation policy, which was a characteristic feature of 
the central planning regime. Under this system jobs were allocated by the government and 
wages were fixed by the authorities. Graduates with secondary and tertiary education were 
assigned jobs in the public sector (Moock et al., 1998). This policy was widely used as part of 
a concerted effort to promote the socio-economic development of ethnic minority groups. As a 
result, graduates from the majority ethnic group were allocated to the remote and mountainous 
areas, while ethnic minority graduates were placed in different organizations in urban areas, 
where the majority predominantly resides. In addition, the government also formulated a 
separate policy for educating ethnic minority graduates at public colleges and universities. 
Through the tertiary education system, which is mainly dependent on the State budget, the 
Ministry of Education and Training (MoET) allocates a target number for ethnic minority 
students. The ethnic minority students under this arrangement are fully funded and subject to a 
separate university entrance examination, which is regarded as easier than the national 
university entrance examination (MoET, 2006). Though the number of these graduates is 
relatively small, comprising about 8,000 ethnic minority students from a total of more than 1.3 
million Vietnamese university students in the 2005/6 academic year, they were obligated to 
return to their home provinces after graduation to take jobs in wage employment in certain 
remote and mountainous regions. 
The government, in recognition of the importance of improving the living standards of the 
ethnic minorities and reducing the household income gap between different ethnic groups, also 
introduced a number of supportive policies and programs. The Comprehensive Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Strategy (CPRGS), which was approved by the Prime Minister of 
Vietnam in 2002, outlined a number of objectives designed to promote the provision of basic 
infrastructure and social services for ethnic minorities (e.g., in education and healthcare). In 
conjunction with this general strategy, there have also been national programs that specifically 
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target ethnic minorities and the poorest households, which are overwhelmingly rural based and 
focused on ethnic minority groups. Most notably, Program 135 was launched in 1998 (see 
MOLISA and UNDP, 2004) and facilitated the development of infrastructure in villages and 
communes (e.g., in terms of the construction and maintenance of roads, small irrigation dams, 
clean water systems, schools, health centers and other infrastructure projects) in the 
mountainous and remote areas of Vietnam. The Program covered 1715 communes with a 
population of around 1.1 million households comprising more than six million people. 
The National Program on Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction (HEPR) also provided 
another tool for reducing the gap between the disadvantaged and more advantaged regions 
(SRV, 2001). It has recently provided credits, support services for poor households, and 
capacity building for local authorities not covered under Program 135. Although the 
effectiveness of these programs in achieving their targets is subject to some criticism (Baulch 
et al. 2004), the recent evaluation by MOLISA and UNDP (2004) suggests success in terms of 
improving the healthcare and educational services for the poor in general and the ethnic 
minorities in particular.  
Despite the above array of government policies to assist ethnic minorities, the proportion of 
ethnic groups represented in total wage employment remains modest in Vietnam. Though 
accounting for nearly 14 percent of the total population in 2002, the ethnic minority groups 
comprised only six percent of total wage employment and 12 percent of the total labour force 
(authors’ calculations based on the VHLSS 2002). The incidence of wage employment within 
the ethnic minorities is substantially lower than the Kinh and Chinese, henceforth known as the 
majority [3]. On average, only 15 percent of the ethnic minority labour force is wage-employed 
while the corresponding figure for the majority is nearly twice that rate. At the household level, 
14 percent of ethnic minority households have wage earner(s) among their household 
members, while 41 percent of majority households receive wage incomes from the 
employment of their household members.  
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Table 1, using data from the VHLSS 2002,  reveals that the household welfare gap between the 
majority and the minority is much smaller if ethnic minority household members are employed 
in the wage employment sector. More interestingly, the educational levels of the ethnic 
minority wage workers are considerably closer to their majority counterparts (except in the 
proportion of workers who have graduated from universities/colleges). Although the overall 
majority/minority gap in living standards remains high as suggested in earlier studies (see 
above), this gap narrows substantially for those who are in the wage employment sector. This 
can be taken to suggest tentatively that the ethnic minority wage earners have perhaps become 
more assimilated (or ‘Vietnamized’ in the language of some ethnologists (see Dang et al., 
2000; Baulch et al., 2004)) within the majority group compared to non-wage earners from the 
same ethnic groups.  
[Take in Table 1] 
Despite apparent evidence of similarities between the Kinh/Chinese and the ethnic minority 
wage earners, table 2 reveals an ethnic wage gap across a number of different dimensions. The 
raw data on the hourly wage rate reveals a statistically significant minority/majority wage gap 
of about 11 percent. Though the raw earnings differentials vary across sectors of employment, 
education groups, and location (i.e., urban or rural settlement areas), the data consistently 
reveal an earnings gap between the majority and minority groups. This is re-affirmed by the 
kernel density plots of the wages depicted in Figure 1.  
 [Take in Table 2 and Figure 1] 
3.  Econometric Methodology 
3.1  Decomposition Methodologies  
Following the seminal work of Mincer (1974), it is conventional to specify log wages as a 
function of a set of wage determining characteristics with the most austere form including only 
controls for human capital.  The specification is then augmented to capture other variables 
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viewed as important in the wage determination process.  In the context of the ethnic wage gap, 
the ethnic-specific labour market earnings equations for an ith individual are specified as 
follows: 
mmmm μβxw += '                                                              (1) 
eeee μβxw += '                                                                 (2)  
where xj is a (k ´ n) matrix of human capital and other characteristics (e.g., education, labour 
force experience, employment sector etc.) and j is the ethnic group subscript; b is a (k ´ 1) 
vector of unknown parameters capturing the effect of various covariates on the natural log 
wage (w); m is a (n ´ 1) vector of random error terms; and m and e denote the majority and 
minority groups respectively.   
Applying the conventional Oaxaca (1973) decomposition, the estimated mean ethnic difference 
in log wages is generally expressed as:   
)ˆˆ('ˆ)'( ememem ββxβxxww em -+-=-                                        (3) 
where the ‘bar’ denotes mean values and the ‘hat’ denotes coefficient estimates. This allows 
the overall average differential in wages between the two ethnic groups to be decomposed into 
a part attributable to differences in characteristics (known as the ‘explained’ or ‘endowment’ 
effect) and a part attributable to differences in the estimated returns to characteristics between 
majority and minority workers (known as the ‘unexplained’,  ‘treatment’ or ‘residual’ effect). 
The final part of expression (3) is sometimes taken to capture the effect of unequal treatment 
within the labour market. 
The use of an ‘index number’ approach is subject to the conventional ‘index number’ problem.  
Expression (3) could therefore be re-expressed in terms of average majority characteristics and 
yield numerically different values for the component parts compared to (3) above [4].  The re-
formulation yields:  
)ˆˆ('ˆ)'( emmeem ββxβxxww em -+-=-                                     (4) 
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The foregoing decompositions associated with (3) and (4) are traditionally cast within the mean 
regression framework.  An exclusive focus on the mean, however, may provide an incomplete 
account of the ethnic pay gap.  The estimation of a set of conditional quantile functions allows 
for a more detailed portrait of the relationship between the conditional wage distribution and 
selected covariates than that provided by mean regression analysis. In contrast to the OLS 
approach, the quantile regression procedure is less sensitive to outliers and provides a more 
robust estimator in the face of departures from normality (Koenker, 2005; Koenker and Basset, 
1978). In addition, Deaton (1997, pp.80-85) notes that quantile regression models may also 
possess better properties than OLS in the presence of heteroscedasticity. Using this 
methodology, the log wage equation may be estimated conditional on a given specification for 
various percentiles of the residuals (e.g., 10th, 25th, 50th 75th or 90th (see Chamberlain, 1994)).      
In the current case, the quantile regression for the majority and minority sub-samples can be 
defined as: 
mmmm qq μβxw += '                                                               (5) 
eeee qq μβxw += '                                               (6) 
If Qq (×) is taken to denote the conditional qth quantile operator, then jjjjQ qq βxxw ')( = , 
where jqβ is the unknown parameter vector for the qth quantile with q  representing the selected 
quantile of interest (i.e., 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 0.9 in the current application) ; mqj  denotes the 
error term, the distribution of which is left unspecified but for which 0)( =jjQ xqq m  is 
assumed; and j is the subscript for the ethnic group.  
From equations (5) and (6) the conditional qth quantile of the distribution of wages for the 
two groups are then expressed as: 
))((ˆ))'(()( mmmmmmmm QEQEQ wwβwwxw qqqqq m =+==                           (7) 
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))((ˆ))'(()( eeeeeeee QEQEQ wwβwwxw qqqqq m =+==                                 (8) 
where the ‘hats’ now denote quantile regression estimates and E(×) denotes the expectations 
operator.  In the expressions (7) and (8), the characteristics are evaluated conditionally at the 
unconditional quantile log wage value and not unconditionally as in the case of the mean 
regression. The terms ))(( jjj QE ww qqm =  are thus non-zero. From (7) and (8), the ethnic pay 
gap at the qth quantile is defined as Dq and this can be decomposed into three parts: 
qqqqqq RβΩβΩ D+D+D=D ˆ'ˆ' em                                                    (9) 
where )ˆˆ(ˆ em qqq βββ -=D  and em qqq ΩΩΩ -=D   
with ))(( mmmm QE wwxΩ qq ==  and ))(( eeee QE wwxΩ qq ==  
 and ))](())(([ eeemmm QEQE wwμwwμR qqqqq =-==D  
 
The term qRD  is best interpreted as a difference in unobservables between the two 
ethnic groups.  Given the ‘index number’ approach noted earlier, the ethnic pay gap can also 
be decomposed as: 
qqqqqq RβΩβΩ D+D+D=D ˆ'ˆ' me                                                  (10) 
Using mean characteristics in the computation of (9) and (10) may provide unrepresentative 
realizations for the characteristics at points other than the conditional mean wage to which they 
relate. Therefore, it is necessary to use realizations of the characteristics that more accurately 
reflect the relevant points on the conditional wage distribution. In order to address this issue, 
we use an approach originally suggested by Machado and Mata (2005) to derive the 
realizations for the relevant characteristics at different quantiles of the conditional wage 
distribution.  The procedure involves drawing 100 observations at random and with 
replacement from each of the majority and minority sub-samples.  Each observation once 
ranked comprises a percentile point on the wage distribution. The full set of characteristics for 
the observation at the qth wage quantile is then retrieved. This process is then replicated 200 
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times to obtain 200 observations at the selected qth quantile.  The mean characteristics of these 
observations at each quantile are then used to construct the realizations for mqΩ and eqΩ used in 
equations (9) and (10) [5].  
3.2  Selection Bias Issues  
There is a potential selection issue governing the analysis of the ethnic pay gap in this study. 
Either through a process of self-selection by individuals or sample selection by employers, the 
engagement of individuals in wage employment activity may not be interpretable as the 
outcome of a random process. Heckman (1979) and Lee (1983) provide well-known solutions 
to this problem. 
The mean wage decomposition in the presence of selectivity correction favoured by many 
authors is expressed as [6]:    
)ˆˆ()ˆˆ('ˆ)'( eemmememem ltlt -+-+-=- ββxβxxww em                        (11) 
where the definitions outlined for (3) above apply but with jtˆ  representing the OLS estimate 
of the j selection parameter for each ethnic group, and jl  is the corresponding sample 
averaged selection variable for the jth ethnic group obtained from either a probit model’s 
estimates (if there are two work choices or outcomes as per Heckman, 1979) or a multinomial 
logit model’s estimates (if there are more than two work choices or outcomes as per Lee, 
1983). Given the ‘index number’ problem, the ethnic pay gap can also be re-expressed as 
follows: 
 )ˆˆ()ˆˆ('ˆ)'( eemmemmeem ltlt -+-+-=- ββxβxxww em                  (12) 
There is currently little consensus regarding the most appropriate treatment for selectivity bias 
in quantile regression models. Buchinsky (1999) uses the work of Newey (1999) to 
approximate the selection term through use of a higher order series expansion. The power 
series is based on the inverse Mills ratio or transformations of it. This approach has 
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implications, however, for the identification of the wage regression intercept term given its 
conflation with the constant term associated with the higher order series providing the proxy 
for the selection effect. However, if the choice outcomes are multiple rather than binary, as in 
the current application (see below), the appropriate correction is less straightforward.  Given a 
lack of consensus and the potential intercept identification problem associated with the 
introduction of higher order selection terms into quantile regression models, we simply insert a 
conventionally computed selection correction term into the quantile regression models. This 
could be taken to provide a reasonably good approximation for the selection effect in the 
quantile regression model and was, for example, used by Arcand and D’Hombres (2004) in 
their analysis of ethnic differences in labour market earnings in Brazil.   We take the view that 
it is better to introduce an albeit imperfect proxy for the selection effect in this application 
rather than ignoring the problem completely.  However, as a robustness check, we do explore 
the implication for our results if the selection terms are excluded from the specifications.    
The ethnic pay gap at the qth quantile is thus now decomposed into four parts: 
qqqqqqq tD+D+D+D=D RβΩβΩ ˆ'ˆ' em                                                (13) 
 
with definitions as in (9) above, and where the fourth component represents the difference in 
the selection effect defined as ))]((ˆ))((ˆ[ eeeemmmm QEQE wwww qqqqq ltltt =-==D . 
The ethnic pay gap can also be decomposed as: 
qqqqqqq tD+D+D+D=D RβΩβΩ ˆ'ˆ' me                                                (14) 
In order to address the problem of selectivity bias in this paper we exploit the approach 
developed by Lee (1983). The procedure is two-step and, in our application, exploits estimates 
from a three-category multinomial logit model (MNL) for the majority and minority sub-
samples to construct the set of relevant selection correction terms. The three employment 
outcomes used in our case are (i) farming, (ii) wage employment, and (iii) self-employment in 
non-farm activities.  
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4. Empirical Analysis 
The sample data used comprise all those in wage employment from both gender groups aged 
between 18 and 60 years and covers employees across a range of enterprise types (e.g., public, 
SOE, private etc.).  The wage rate used is an hourly measure relating to the individual’s 
primary or main job and includes basic rates and other payments in terms of bonuses, 
allowances, subsidies both in cash and in kind. This definition of the wage has been widely 
used in other labour market studies for Vietnam such as Liu (2004), Gallup (2004), and Pham 
and Reilly (2007).  In contrast to the standard Mincerian specification, the current study uses a 
set of educational dummies to capture human capital effects. In order to allow for variation in 
the returns to these human capital measures across urban and rural settlement types, a set of 
variables interacting urban residence with the educational controls were also included in the 
regression models estimated [7].   In addition, as there is insufficient information in the 
VHLSS 2002 to compute actual labour force experience, the age of an individual rather than a 
potential labour force measure is used to proxy for labour market experience [8].  The age 
variable is parameterised in the wage specification through a set of age dummies.  The other 
characteristics included in the wage regression models comprise controls for gender, marital 
status, sector of employment defined according to ownership type, a health status measure 
based on whether the individual recently had medical treatment [9], a control for the quarter in 
which the interview occurred to capture any seasonal effects that may impact on the wage 
determination process, and a set of regional controls. A brief description of these variables (and 
their corresponding summary statistics) is provided in table A1 of the Appendix. 
A set of household-level variables were used to identify the selection effects in the wage 
equations.  These include the number of children and the dependency ratio within the 
household, the educational attainment and occupation of the head of household, and whether 
the household had access to non-labour income sources. The MNL estimates for the three-
category employment model are neither reported nor discussed here in order to conserve space 
[10].    
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Table 3 reports the estimates for the pooled regression model where ethnicity enters as an 
intercept shift and provides an estimate of the ceteris paribus ‘mark-up’ for the majority wage 
workers over their ethnic minority counterparts.  The table reveals that an ethnic majority 
worker earns over 11 percent more in hourly wages relative to an ethnic minority worker, 
considerably more modest than the ethnic differentials computed for Vietnam using household 
welfare measures [11].  The estimates from the quantile regression model at the median are 
comparable to the mean regression results perhaps suggesting that outliers do not represent a 
significant problem in this application. The results from the quantile regression models reveal a 
narrowing ceteris paribus ethnic pay gap with movement up the conditional wage distribution. 
Around the bottom decile of the conditional wage distribution, the ‘mark-up’ is nearly 21 
percent compared to only four percent at the top decile.  These findings at the extremes of the 
conditional wage distribution could tentatively be argued as being consistent with the notion of 
‘sticky floors’ at the bottom end of the conditional wage distribution, where ethnic minority 
workers are crowded into low-paying jobs, and indicating an absence of a ‘glass-ceiling’ for 
ethnic minority workers at the top end of the distribution [12].  However, these twin inferences, 
in the absence of additional supporting evidence, are best interpreted as suggestive rather than 
compelling.      
[Take in Table 3] 
Attention now turns to the decomposition of the ethnic wage gap into treatment and 
endowment effects. The coefficient estimates for the separate ethnic wage equations are 
reported in tables A2 and A3 of the Appendix but are not the subject of separate discussion 
here. The null hypothesis of common parameters across the two ethnic groups is decisively 
rejected on the basis of appropriately computed Wald tests in all relevant cases (see table 3 and 
the corresponding table notes).  The separation of the data points across the ethnic groups used 
here is thus empirically justified. 
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It is worth noting that the estimated selection effects in the mean regressions for both the 
majority and minority groups are both well determined statistically (see tables A2 and A3).  
Given the construction of the Lee (1983) selection term, the estimated negative effect suggests 
intuitively plausible positive selection into wage employment for both groups (see Gyorko and 
Tracy, 1988; Reilly, 1991).  The average selection effects for the majority and minority 
workers are computed at 0.22 and 0.23 respectively (i.e., the estimated selection coefficients 
(from tables A2 and A3) multiplied by the sample average selection value (from table A1)).  
This suggests that an average individual from either one of the two ethnic groups that selects 
into wage employment earns [e0.22 – 1]´100 ≈ 25% more in hourly wages than someone drawn 
at random from the relevant ethnic population group with comparable observable 
characteristics.  This could be interpretable as a labour market premium to unobservables, 
which appears broadly comparable in magnitude across the two groups.   
The decomposition results for the mean regressions are reported in table 4.  As selection effects 
are present in all reported regression models, we decompose the ethnic wage gap using 
expressions (11) to (14).  As the estimates appear insensitive to the set of characteristics used 
to compute the pay gaps, interpretation will focus on the decomposition estimates based on 
equations (11) and (13) only.   
The point estimates for all the treatment and endowment effects are found to be precisely 
determined at a conventional level of statistical significance. In raw terms the average gap in 
log hourly wages between the majority and minority ethnic groups is dimensionally 
comparable to ceteris paribus estimates based on the pooled OLS regression model (see table 
3).  On average, majority workers earn nearly 11 percent more than their minority counterparts. 
However, the estimates based on the mean regression models reveal that about one-third of this 
differential is accounted for by differentials in the average characteristics between the two 
groups (i.e., the endowment effect). The treatment effect accounts for just under two-thirds of 
the earnings differential, with the remaining negligible amount attributable to selection effects. 
This suggests that most of the ethnic wage gap is due to differentials in returns to a given 
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‘basket’ of characteristics. This could be interpreted as representing unequal treatment in 
favour of the wage employed majority group with the average ‘mark-up’ of the order of about 
seven percent. 
In order to investigate the robustness of the findings for the mean regression models, the wage 
specifications for both majority and minority groups are augmented by a set of district effects 
[13].  The motivation for this is driven by the fact that ethnic minorities in Vietnam tend to be 
geographically differentiated.  A failure to control for a finely disaggregated degree of regional 
heterogeneity may bias, among other things, the estimated treatment effects.  The inclusion of 
these controls is thus designed to attenuate any potential bias in regard to this source of 
heterogeneity.  Although the estimated effects for the treatment components reported in table 4 
are subject to a very mild contraction with the introduction of the district effects, the magnitude 
of the change is modest.   
[Take in Table 4] 
The decomposition of the pay gap between the two ethnic groups based on the quantile 
regression models is now reported in table 5 [14]. The raw earnings differentials are widest at 
the bottom decile of the conditional wage distribution, decline with movement up this 
distribution, and are narrowest around the top decile.  The computed treatment effects are more 
modest in magnitude than those suggested by the pooled regression models reported in table 3.  
However, the suggestive narrative offered above in regard to a ‘sticky-floor’ at the bottom end 
of the distribution (where the ‘mark-up’ is about 13%) and the apparent absence of a ‘glass-
ceiling’ at the top end (where the ‘mark-up’ is about 1.6%) remains intact.       
The portion of the ethnic wage gap that is accounted for by differences in endowments 
monotonically increases with movement up the conditional wage distribution. At the 10th 
percentile, the endowment effect comprises just nine percent of the raw earnings differential, 
while the corresponding figure at the 90th percentile is close to one-half. Despite this increasing 
endowment effect, the ethnic wage differentials are still largely attributable to differentials in 
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the prices the Vietnam labour market uses to value these characteristics for the different ethnic 
groups.  The minority workers tend to have lower estimated returns to their endowments across 
the selected points of the conditional wage distribution examined here [15], [16].  
[Take in Table 5] 
The amalgamation of the ethnic minority groups into one homogeneous category for the 
purposes of analysis disguises potential variation in the magnitude of ethnic pay disparity 
between groups within this conflated category.  The treatment effects, and their corresponding 
sampling variances, can be computed for each individual in the ethnic minority sub-sample.  
Thus, as a final illustrative exercise, we investigate for the presence of variation in the 
treatment effects across a number of broadly defined ethnic minority sub-groups.  Given the 
constraints associated with using adequately sized cells, the groups we use comprise five in 
total.  The groupings we use are intended to be functional and are based on discussions 
with Vietnamese anthropologists and local NGOs.  The ethnic categories comprise the 
(i) Khmer and Cham; (ii) Tay, Thai, Muong, Nung; (iii) Other Northern minorities; (iv) 
Central Highland minorities; (v) an ‘other’ or miscellaneous category comprising the 
remaining smaller ethnic groups, which are mostly located in the North and South 
Central Coasts. For each ethnic minority individual we can compute their treatment effect 
based on what they would earn if they belonged to the majority group and what they earn given 
their minority group affiliation broadly defined.  A standard error can also be computed for 
each individual’s estimated treatment effect and this can be used to undertake a simple 
weighted least squares (WLS) regression of the treatment effects on a set of four ethnic 
minority dummies using only the data for the minority sub-sample [17].  The Khmer and Cham 
group provide the base category in the estimation of this regression model.  Table 6 reveals a 
degree of variation in the treatment effects across ethnic groups but suggests that only about 
one-quarter of the total variation in the treatment effects are actually explained by these 
controls.  In particular, the treatment effects for the Tay, Thai, Muong and Nung are 
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statistically smaller than the base group at the mean and at all selected points of the conditional 
wage distribution.  Thus, this group could be taken to experience the smallest ethnic wage 
disadvantage relative to the Kinh-Hoa.  The largest treatment effects, and thus the largest 
degree of labour market ethnic disadvantage, are reserved for those wage employed individuals 
that belong to the Central Highland minorities.     
[Take in Table 6] 
5. Conclusions 
The portrait that emerges from the above analysis suggests evidence of wage inequality 
between the majority and minority groups in Vietnam [18]. The degree of ethnic minority wage 
disadvantage is considerably more modest than the ethnic gap in livings standards reported for 
Vietnam in 2002 (see footnote 11). At first glance, this finding appears to conflict with the 
widening gap in the living standards between the Kinh (and Chinese) and other ethnic minority 
groups reported in the literature (Winrock International, 1996; Poverty Task Force (PTF), 
2002; Baulch et al. 2004). However, the labour market earnings differential is based on a 
sample-selected sub-group of the ethnic minority that appears to perform reasonably well 
within a Vietnamese labour market historically dominated by the Kinh majority. For the ethnic 
minorities in this selective sub-population, the data demonstrate that their living standards, and 
other observable characteristics associated with well-being (e.g., their education levels), are 
almost indistinguishable from those of the majority.  
Despite evidence of a relatively good labour market performance, our analysis reveals that, on 
average, the ethnic minority group secures lower returns in the labour market for their 
endowments than the majority group. The raw wage premium for the majority is of the order of 
11 percent but only one third of this is ascribed to differences in the average characteristics 
between the majority and minority groups.  The remaining portion is largely attributable to 
differentials in returns to endowments given negligible differences in selection effects between 
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the two groups. In addition, although the ethnic ‘mark-up’ was found to be relatively high 
among those at the bottom end of the conditional wage distribution, it declined monotonically 
with movement up the distribution and little evidence of a ‘glass-ceiling’ effect for the ethnic 
minority was detected at the top end of the wage distribution.   
The narrow gap in wages between the majority and minority groups could be taken to suggest 
that economic progress through the labour market may offer a way out of poverty.  However, 
we need to temper this inference with some caution.  Firstly, our econometric estimates suggest 
that the narrow average pay gap may be attributable to the fact that the ethnic minority workers 
currently in wage employment, on average, possess unobservables that predispose them to 
secure favourable rewards in the labour market.  And even with these favourable 
unobservables, the ethnic minority group earns less, on average, than the majority due to lower 
labour market returns to their characteristics.  The inevitable expansion of wage employment in 
Vietnam in response to economic growth is likely to encourage the participation of those with 
poorer levels of unobservables and, if these are drawn disproportionately from ethnic minority 
groups, the ethnic pay gap is likely to widen.  Secondly, the existence of a large treatment 
effect at the bottom end of the conditional wage distribution suggests that ethnic minorities in 
the lower paid jobs are most at risk of unequal treatment.  There is no guarantee with the future 
anticipated expansion of wage employment that this effect will not encroach further up the 
conditional wage distribution.   
The issue of ethnic wage inequality has not been highlighted in Vietnam’s most recently 
announced economic strategy or national programs. Given our findings, and an increasingly 
important putative role for the wage employment sector in the future, we believe that an 
emphasis on labour market ethnic wage inequality should be a core theme highlighted within 
Vietnam’s national program for ethnic development. 
Finally, it should be noted that this study limited itself to the ethnic earnings gap of the wage 
employed, which in 2002 accounted for roughly 28 percent of total employment in Vietnam 
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(see table 2). The remaining employment category includes the self-employed operating in 
either agriculture or non-farm activities. The self-employed group is largely beyond the 
influence of official labour market regulations (ADB, 2004; Brassard, 2004), so the magnitude 
of the ethnic wage gap for this employment category could be wider than that reported here. 
However, investigating the ethnic earnings differential for the self-employed is constrained by 
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Notes 
1. It is not clear how, if at all, the non-sampling errors associated with the VHLSS 2002 impact on 
the data for the wage employment sector used here.  However, it is worth noting that the ethnic 
representation within this survey compares favourably with the earlier and the later surveys that 
were not subject to non-sampling error problems.        
2. The ethnic status of the individual is determined by the ethnic status of the head of household 
within which the individual is located. 
3. In common with other studies on ethnic underdevelopment in Vietnam, the Chinese ethnic 
group, which ranks 6th in terms of population size in Vietnam, is merged with the Kinh 
majority group for the purposes of our analysis. The Chinese households are generally well-off 
in Vietnam (see Van de Walle and Gunewardana, 2001). As the objective of this study is to 
examine the plight of disadvantaged ethnic groups in the waged labour market, the Chinese 
group is conflated with the Kinh to define the majority, while all other ethnic groups are taken 
to represent the minority. 
4. This is commonly referred to as the ‘index number’ approach given its similarity to the 
calculation of index numbers in the field of statistics.  It is well known from undergraduate 
statistics that an index number computed using the Laspeyres formula does not yield a 
numerical value that is identical to an index number computed using the Paasche formula.  This 
conflict is the essence of the ‘index number’ problem reported here.      
5. The emphasis on decomposing ethnic wage differences using quantile regression models is in 
the spirit of work undertaken for Brazil on racial pay gaps by Arias, Yamada and Tejerina 
(2004) and Arcand and D’Hombres (2004).    
6. See Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) for a more extensive discussion of issues related to ‘index 
number’ decompositions and selectivity correction. 
7. We also explored using both mean and quantile regression models whether the estimated 
returns for other variables varied across the urban/rural divide for both the majority and 
minority groups.  Wald tests revealed no evidence of differential returns using either sub-
samples for variables other than the human capital measures.  In addition, we also investigated 
whether estimated returns varied between the north and the south of the country but again 
found no evidence for this.  The test results for both these exercises are available from the 
corresponding author on request. 
8. Other studies on Vietnam have computed potential labour force experience by using the 
individual’s age minus estimated years in schooling minus the school enrolment age. In 
addition to the potential measurement error embodied in any ‘years-in-schooling’ variable, this 
approach might also introduce an additional error if it fails to take into account discrepancies in 
the enrolment ages and years of school repetition, which is quite common in the more remote 
areas of Vietnam.  
9. It could be argued that the health status measure and wages are endogenously determined 
rendering suspect its inclusion as an exogenous variable.  The fact that the health status 
measure pre-dates the current wage used suggests the assumption of exogeneity could be 
viewed as relatively innocuous.  However, the absence of good instruments to test explicitly 
this exogeneity proposition suggests some interpretational caution should perhaps be exercised 
in respect of this variable’s estimates. 
10. The Multinomial logit (MNL) model passes the test for the independence from irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA) proposition for both ethnic groups using the Small-Hsiao (1987) test in all but 
one case, thus broadly satisfying a necessary condition for the use of the Lee (1983) procedure 
in our application. The test results are available from the corresponding author on request.    
11. Using data for the full sample of households from the same VHLSS 2002, the ceteris paribus 
gap in living standards between the majority and the minority, as measured by per capita 
household expenditure, is nearly 26 percent. This ceteris paribus gap is obtained from the 
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ethnic dummy estimate in an OLS equation of the log household per capita expenditure on a 
comparably defined ethnic dummy and characteristics capturing the education, age, and gender 
of the household head, household demographic structure, household landholding, other non-
labour income sources, and location. This specification is similar to that reported in Baulch et 
al., (2004) with the exception that the head of household education attainment levels are 
specified as in Van de Walle and Gunewardana (2001).  
12. Albrecht, Björklund and Vroman (2003), Arulampalan, Booth and Bryan (2005), and De la 
Rica, Dolado and Llorens (2007) provide explanations of ‘glass ceilings’ and ‘sticky floors’ for 
a variety of countries in the context of gender pay gaps using quantile regression models.     
13. There were 503 district effects introduced into the majority mean regression equation and 167 
into the corresponding minority equation.  
14. Unfortunately, the parameters of the quantile regression models are not estimable with standard 
econometric software when the district effects (see footnote 13) are included given the 
prohibitively large number of parameters this implies.  Thus, the decompositions are based on 
models that exclude the district effects but include the standard regional controls.  However, we 
take some comfort from the fact that mean regression estimates for treatment and endowment 
effects are found to be fairly insensitive to the exclusion of the district effects.  
15. In order to determine whether the reported results are sensitive to the removal from the 
majority group of the small Chinese ethnic group, we re-estimated the wage regression models 
for the Kinh as the only majority group. The resultant estimates for the treatment and 
endowment components were found to be invariant to this exclusion using both mean and 
quantile regression models. The results of this exercise are available from the corresponding 
author on request.            
16. Given reservations expressed about the use of the ad hoc selection term in the quantile 
regression models, the decompositions were also re-computed for quantile regression models 
estimated without the inclusion of a selection term.  This exercise resulted in only modest 
changes to the relevant point estimates for the treatment and endowment effects and did not 
alter any of the inferences contained in the text. The results of this exercise are available from 
the corresponding author on request.          
17. The weighted least squares procedure in this application is designed to give a higher weight in 
estimation to the more precisely estimated treatment effects within the minority sub-sample. 
18. The magnitude of the ethnic wage gap in the Vietnamese labour market is modest when 
compared to the recent experience of a number of transitional European labour markets.  For 
example, see Kroncke and Smith (1999) for Estonia and Giddings (2003) for Bulgaria.    
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Majority and Minority Groups   
 Majority (1) 
Minority 
(2) 
z-score  or 
t-statistics 





z-score or  
t-statistics 
(4) - (3) 
Household Living standards         
− Poverty headcount (%)  23.81 65.40 52.28*** 17.24 43.53 14.15*** 
− Poverty gap (%)  5.00 21.02 35.81*** 5.00 19.02 10.62*** 
− Mean expenditure p.c (VND 1000) 3,697 1,911 35.11*** 4,361 2,712 7.72*** 
− Sample size (no. of households) 25,454 4,078 f 10,301 575 f 
Individual educational attainments (%)        
− Illiteracy 19.66 49.39 40.88*** 13.69 18.70 12.21*** 
− Primary education 27.98 28.16  1.02 22.66 24.79 1.81* 
− Lower secondary education 31.75 15.86 21.55*** 24.46 21.32 5.93*** 
− Upper secondary education 12.56 4.23 11.35*** 15.01 17.40 2.87*** 
− Technical/vocational training 4.46 1.71 5.48*** 11.81 11.17 3.49*** 
− College/university 3.60 0.65 10.71*** 12.37 6.63 3.70*** 
Source: calculations from the VHLSS 2002 
Notes to table 1:  
a. (1) represents the Kinh (or Chinese) headed households; (2) comprises the ethnic minority households ; (3) refers to 
the majority households that have at least one member who was wage-employed; and (4) denotes the ethnic 
minority households that have at least one member who was wage-employed. 
b. The poverty headcount and poverty gap index is calculated using the 2002 general poverty line developed by GSO 
and the World Bank. This general poverty line is based on expenditure on the food basket of the 3rd quintile that is 
equivalent to average consumption of 2,052 calories per day plus the non-food expenditures of the 3rd quintile. The 
rice equivalence of the general poverty line is 51kg. The real monetary value of the general poverty line in 2002 is 
VND 1,920 thousand (adjusted by monthly and regional price indices), where VND denotes the Vietnamese Dong. 
See World Bank (2003) for more details. 
c. f denotes ‘not applicable’. 
d. The individual educational attainments are calculated using the sample of individuals aged from 18 to 60 years who 
were working over the past 12 months. 
e. The z-scores and t-tests are computed to test for statistical differences between the majority and minority groups. 
The test values are reported in absolute terms ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 
levels respectively.  
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Table 2: Majority-Minority Differences by Selected Characteristics   
 Majority  Minority  z-score or          t-statistics 
% 
Change 
Labour force participation rate (%) 81.54 89.70 14.27*** -9.10 
Employment structure (%)     
− Agriculture 48.26 77.40 44.13*** -37.65 
− Wage employment 29.55 15.01  24.55*** 96.87 
− Self-employment outside agriculture 22.18 7.60  27.33*** 191.84 
Wage rates by sector (VND 1000)     
− Government agencies 4.44 4.41 2.72*** 0.68 
− State-owned enterprises 3.88 2.93 1.84* 32.42 
− Formal private enterprises 3.59 2.48      0.23 44.76 
− Household or informal businesses 3.23 2.64  4.98*** 22.35 
Wage rates by education (VND 1000)     
− Illiteracy 3.11 2.63  3.80*** 18.25 
− Primary education 3.41 2.97  2.71*** 14.81 
− Lower secondary education 3.78 3.48 1.67* 8.62 
− Upper secondary education 4.48 4.33 2.57*** 3.46 
− Vocational and technical training 5.05 4.98  5.29*** 1.41 
− College/University 6.95 5.71  2.80*** 21.72 
Average hourly real wage rates (VND 1000)     
− All 4.19 3.76 4.46*** 11.44 
− Urban 5.04 4.44  3.35*** 13.51 
− Rural 3.54 3.24  3.14*** 9.26 
Source: calculations from the VHLSS 2002 
Notes to table 2:  
a. The labour force participation rate is calculated as percentage of those who were working 
during the past 12 months in the total labour force aged from 18 to 60 years old. 
b. Wage rate includes salary, and other payments in cash and kind (bonuses, holidays, subsidies 
etc.). The monthly and regional prices indices were used to adjust the nominal rate to the hourly 
real wage rate (Jan. 2002 prices). 
c. Wage and employment outcomes are defined exclusively in terms of the primary job. 
d. The z-scores and t-tests are testing for the statistical differences between majority and minority 
outcomes. The test results are reported in absolute terms. See notes to table 1 for the starring 
convention used.  
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Table 3: Ethnic Wage Gap in Vietnam: Pooled Regression Results 
 Mean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Kinh (and Chinese) majority 0.1099*** 0.1891*** 0.1699*** 0.1077*** 0.0682*** 0.0416** 
 (0.019) (0.042) (0.025) (0.019) (0.022) (0.021) 
Male worker 0.1303*** 0.1278*** 0.1121*** 0.0871*** 0.097*** 0.078*** 
 (0.009) (0.018) (0.009) (0.01) (0.011) (0.015) 
Married -0.0702*** -0.081*** -0.0733*** -0.0787*** -0.0747*** -0.091*** 
 (0.011) (0.025) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.019) 
Aged from 26 to 35 0.1182*** 0.172*** 0.1263*** 0.1047*** 0.0817*** 0.0948*** 
 (0.012) (0.028) (0.012) (0.014) (0.017) (0.022) 
Aged from 36 to 45 0.1557*** 0.1831*** 0.154*** 0.1424*** 0.1353*** 0.148*** 
 (0.014) (0.03) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.024) 
Aged from 46 to 55 0.1611*** 0.1007*** 0.1355*** 0.1803*** 0.1791*** 0.1956*** 
 (0.016) (0.029) (0.02) (0.018) (0.021) (0.027) 
Aged from 56 to 60 0.1197*** 0.0411 0.0454 0.1557*** 0.1645*** 0.235*** 
 (0.041) (0.115) (0.057) (0.034) (0.053) (0.063) 
Primary education 0.1048*** 0.1478*** 0.0801*** 0.1065*** 0.108*** 0.1252*** 
 (0.015) (0.027) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.028) 
Lower secondary education 0.1103*** 0.1877*** 0.1267*** 0.124*** 0.0888*** 0.0798*** 
 (0.016) (0.029) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.029) 
Upper secondary education 0.2049*** 0.2371*** 0.1479*** 0.1777*** 0.2146*** 0.305*** 
 (0.022) (0.041) (0.029) (0.024) (0.028) (0.04) 
Vocational/Tech. training 0.4645*** 0.5269*** 0.4203*** 0.4333*** 0.4766*** 0.4517*** 
 (0.024) (0.039) (0.031) (0.03) (0.027) (0.046) 
College/University 0.6749*** 0.7659*** 0.7126*** 0.6516*** 0.6307*** 0.5769*** 
 (0.026) (0.046) (0.034) (0.025) (0.028) (0.04) 
Urban  0.1243** 0.1381*** 0.1501*** 0.1308*** 0.0942*** 0.0871** 
 (0.025) (0.045) (0.032) (0.032) (0.029) (0.045) 
Urban*Primary education 0.0145 0.0179 0.0154 -0.0411 -0.0601** -0.0373 
 (0.031) (0.062) (0.033) (0.037) (0.028) (0.053) 
Urban*Lower secondary 0.0639** 0.0099 0.0123 0.0506* 0.042 0.075* 
 (0.031) (0.048) (0.043) (0.028) (0.038) (0.046) 
Urban*Upper secondary 0.1543*** 0.1373** 0.1513*** 0.108*** 0.1081*** 0.0958** 
 (0.035) (0.061) (0.039) (0.025) (0.038) (0.039) 
Urban*Vocational or Tech. 0.0319 0.1078* 0.1055*** 0.0043 0.066** 0.0818* 
 (0.034) (0.056) (0.041) (0.039) (0.03) (0.046) 
Urban*College or University 0.1276*** 0.128** 0.0725** 0.1022** 0.1132** 0.226*** 
 (0.035) (0.059) (0.037) (0.043) (0.047) (0.053) 
Government agencies 0.053*** 0.0824*** 0.0306 0.0609*** 0.1445*** 0.1261*** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.022) (0.017) (0.023) (0.029) 
State-owned enterprises 0.1537*** 0.0636*** 0.1356*** 0.1875*** 0.1973*** 0.1914*** 
 (0.014) (0.023) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.024) 
Formal private enterprises 0.2074*** 0.1916*** 0.1936*** 0.2335*** 0.2069*** 0.16*** 
 (0.014) (0.024) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.025) 
Medical treatment -0.0315* -0.0142 -0.0226 -0.0218 -0.0399* -0.044 
 (0.019) (0.043) (0.026) (0.024) (0.021) (0.034) 
Northern uplands -0.1295*** -0.1542*** -0.1493*** -0.1596*** -0.1545*** -0.1112*** 
 (0.018) (0.027) (0.019) (0.022) (0.02) (0.027) 
Red River Delta -0.1632*** -0.223*** -0.1754*** -0.1796*** -0.1706*** -0.1326*** 
 (0.015) (0.023) (0.018) (0.016) (0.018) (0.024) 
North Central Coast -0.1743*** -0.2295*** -0.1939*** -0.2155*** -0.1766*** -0.1349*** 
 (0.019) (0.026) (0.019) (0.019) (0.028) (0.033) 
South Central Coast -0.0241* -0.0195 -0.0208 -0.047** -0.0588*** -0.0519** 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.027) 
Central Highlands 0.1766*** 0.078** 0.102*** 0.1479*** 0.2323*** 0.2985*** 
 (0.02) (0.035) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.035) 
Mekong River Delta 0.0272* -0.0182 0.0029 0.003 0.0169 0.0647*** 
 (0.014) (0.024) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.023) 
Selection bias correction term -0.2671*** -0.2354** -0.2729*** -0.3457*** -0.3219** -0.2672** 
 (0.078) (0.103) (0.097) (0.136) (0.155) (0.138 
 30 
Constant 0.5539*** -0.0387 0.3559*** 0.603*** 0.9217*** 1.1196*** 
 (0.026) (0.048) (0.03) (0.029) (0.027) (0.035) 
R2/Psuedo R2 0.2918 0.1402 0.1613 0.1901 0.2157 0.2206 
Wald Test (1) ~ 231c  67.534*** 78.901*** 95.725*** 71.029*** 105.67*** 86.205*** 
Wald Test (2)  ~ 232c  
  71.105*** 102.56*** 69.744*** 98.601*** 85.611*** 78.529*** 
Number of observations 16,170 16,170 16,170 16,170 16,170 16,170 
Notes to table 3:  
a. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively.  
b. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The OLS standard errors are based on Huber (1967) and the quantile 
regression estimates are based on bootstrapping with 200 replications. 
c. The specifications also include three controls for the quarters within which the interview was conducted.  
d. The Wald statistics test for common parameters across the two ethnic groups. Wald Test (1) provides an overall test 
for ethnic differences across all parameters other than the constant term.  Wald Test (2) provides an overall test for 
























Using equation (11)       
Without District Effects 0.0355*** 0.0712** 0.0019* Not applicable 0.1087*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0301) (0.0012)  (0.0202) 
With District Effects 0.0323** 0.0652*** 0.0018* 0.0094 0.1087*** 
 (0.0162) (0.0258) (0.0011) (0.0069) (0.0211) 
Using equation (12)      
Without District Effects 0.0387** 0.0681*** 0.0019* Not applicable 0.1087*** 
 (0.0179) (0.0251) (0.0012)  (0.0202) 
With District Effects 0.0298** 0.0677** 0.0018* 0.0094 0.1087*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0275) (0.0011) (0.0069) (0.0211) 
Notes to table 4:  
a. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively;  






















Using equation  (13)      
Ethnic wage gap at 10th 0.0198** 0.1316*** 0.0213 0.0509 0.2236 
 (0.0103) (0.0482) (0.0149)   
Ethnic wage gap at 25th 0.0328** 0.1072*** 0.0215 0.0179 0.1794 
 (0.0149) (0.0357) (0.0159)   
Ethnic wage gap at 50th 0.0338*** 0.0749*** 0.0042* -0.0009 0.1121 
 (0.0135) (0.0266) (0.0024)   
Ethnic wage gap at 75th 0.0279** 0.0495** 0.0069 -0.0085 0.0758 
 (0.0142) (0.0223) (0.0051)   
Ethnic wage gap at 90th 0.0139** 0.0156** 0.0087 -0.0055 0.0327 
 (0.0068) (0.0075) (0.0062)   
Using equation (14)      
Ethnic wage gap at 10th 0.0402*** 0.1112*** 0.0213 0.0509 0.2236 
 (0.0147) (0.0442) (0.0149)   
Ethnic wage gap at 25th 0.0441** 0.0959** 0.0215 0.0179 0.1794 
 (0.0225) (0.0461) (0.0159)   
Ethnic wage gap at 50th 0.0397*** 0.069*** 0.0042* -0.0009 0.1121 
 (0.0135) (0.0257) (0.0024)   
Ethnic wage gap at 75th 0.0357** 0.0417** 0.0069 -0.0085 0.0758 
 (0.0169) (0.0187) (0.0051)   
Ethnic wage gap at 90th 0.0097* 0.0198*** 0.0087 -0.0055 0.0327 
 (0.0058) (0.0077) (0.0062)   
Notes to table 5:  
a. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively.  




Table 6: WLS Regression of Treatment Effects on Ethnic Groups  
 
 Mean 10th 25th Median 75th 90th 
Tay, Thai, Muong, Nung -0.1062*** -0.0984*** -0.1842*** -0.149*** -0.0739*** -0.1076*** 
 (0.023) (0.03) (0.03) (0.014) (0.016) (0.024) 
Other Northern Uplands -0.0399* -0.0788 -0.1481** -0.0817*** -0.0204 -0.0778* 
 (0.022) (0.063) (0.06) (0.029) (0.035) (0.048) 
Central Highland Minorities 0.3422*** 0.725*** 0.4005*** 0.2034*** 0.2236*** 0.1568*** 
 (0.027) (0.042) (0.039) (0.019) (0.023) (0.033) 
Other Minority groups 0.0683 0.0944 0.1747 0.0068 0.0459 0.023 
 (0.079) (0.16) (0.153) (0.073) (0.085) (0.134) 
Constant 0.1143*** 0.1006*** 0.1298*** 0.1223*** 0.103*** 0.1481*** 
 (0.02) (0.018) (0.018) (0.008) (0.01) (0.014) 
Unadjusted R2 0.2693 0.2248 0.2979 0.2666 0.1782 0.1008 
Number of observations 968 968 968 968 968 968 
Notes to table 6: 
a. The weighted least square regressions are estimated using as weights the square root of the sampling variances of 
the treatment effects estimated for each ethnic minority-headed household.  
b. The unadjusted R2 is computed as the squared correlation coefficient between the actual treatment effects and their 
predicted values from the relevant regression model. 
c. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
d. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 levels respectively. 
e. The sample proportions for the following five ethnic groups are in parentheses: the Khmer and Cham (0.39); the 
Tay, Thai, Muong, Nung (0.38); Other Northern Uplands (0.07); Central Highlands minorities (0.13); Other 







Table A1: Variables and Summary Statistics   
 
Variables Variable Description Majority Minority 
Hourly real wage rate Hourly real wage rate including all payment in cash and kind, 





Male worker = 1 if male worker, = 0 if female 0.6244 0.5702 
Married = 1 if married, = 0 otherwise 0.6470 0.6736 
Aged from 18 to 25 = 1 if aged less than 25, = 0 otherwise 0.2785 0.2769 
Aged from 26 to 35 = 1 if aged from 26 to 35, = 0 otherwise 0.3063 0.2707 
Aged from 36 to 45 = 1 if aged from 36 to 45, = 0 otherwise 0.2733 0.2965 
Aged from 46 to 55 = 1 if aged from 46 to 55, = 0 otherwise 0.1271 0.1426 
Aged from 56 to 60 = 1 if aged from 56 and over, = 0 otherwise 0.0149 0.0134 
Illiteracy = 1 if no schooling, = 0 otherwise 0.1364 0.2789 
Primary education = 1 if having primary education, = 0 otherwise 0.2179 0.1932 
Lower secondary education = 1 if having lower secondary education, = 0 otherwise 0.2440 0.1601 
Upper secondary education = 1 if having upper secondary education, = 0 otherwise 0.1370 0.1043 
Vocational/Tech. training = 1 if having vocational/technical training, = 0 otherwise 0.1339 0.1736 
College/University = 1 if having college/university education, = 0 otherwise 0.1310 0.0899 
Government agencies = 1 if working for government agencies, = 0 otherwise 0.1058 0.1973 
State-owned enterprises = 1 if working for state-owned enterprises, = 0 otherwise 0.0644 0.0341 
Formal private enterprises = 1 if working for formal private enterprises, = 0 otherwise 0.0557 0.0279 
Household enterprises = 1 if working for other household enterprises 0.7741 0.7407 
Medical treatment = 1 if treated in hospital recently, = 0 otherwise 0.0470 0.0589 
Urban = 1 if residing in urban areas, = 0 otherwise 0.4359 0.4318 
Northern Uplands =1 if Northern Uplands, = 0 otherwise 0.0992 0.4628 
Red River Delta = 1 if Red River Delta, = 0 otherwise 0.2475 0.0238 
North Central Coast  = 1 if North Central Coast, = 0 otherwise 0.0857 0.0176 
South Central Coast  = 1 if South Central Coast, = 0 otherwise 0.1535 0.0196 
Central Highlands = 1 if Central Highlands, = 0 otherwise 0.0811 0.1250 
Southeast = 1 if Southeast, = 0 otherwise 0.1222 0.0558 
Mekong River Delta =1 if Mekong River Delta, = 0 otherwise 0.2108 0.2955 
Interviewed in the 1st quarter = 1 if being interviewed in quarter 1, = 0 otherwise 0.2404 0.2851 
Interviewed in the 2nd quarter = 1 if  being interviewed in quarter 2, = 0 otherwise 0.2698 0.2459 
Interviewed in the 3rd quarter = 1 if being interviewed in quarter 3, = 0 otherwise 0.2544 0.2531 
Interviewed in the 4th quarter = 1 if being interviewed in quarter 4, = 0 otherwise 0.2354 0.2159 
Number of observations  15202 968 
Source: calculations from the VHLSS 2002 
Notes to table A1:  
a. The standard deviations for continuous variables only are reported in parentheses. 
 
Table A2: Kinh (and Chinese) Majority Wage Equation 
 Mean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Male worker 0.1087*** 0.1485*** 0.123*** 0.1024*** 0.1093*** 0.0908*** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.018) 
Married -0.0737*** -0.0841*** -0.0655*** -0.082*** -0.0787*** -0.0921*** 
 (0.011) (0.025) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.021) 
Aged from 26 to 35 0.1129*** 0.1603*** 0.1162*** 0.0981*** 0.0821*** 0.086*** 
 (0.012) (0.025) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.021) 
Aged from 36 to 45 0.1453*** 0.1564*** 0.1372*** 0.1354*** 0.1417*** 0.1456*** 
 (0.014) (0.026) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.03) 
Aged from 46 to 55 0.1505*** 0.0671** 0.105*** 0.1807*** 0.1904*** 0.2088*** 
 (0.018) (0.032) (0.023) (0.025) (0.022) (0.033) 
Aged from 56 to 60 0.0814* 0.0925 0.0238 0.1426*** 0.1942*** 0.2297*** 
 (0.044) (0.124) (0.056) (0.049) (0.057) (0.064) 
Primary education 0.1033*** 0.1391*** 0.0828*** 0.1024*** 0.1089*** 0.1259*** 
 (0.015) (0.027) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.029) 
Lower secondary education 0.0997*** 0.1761*** 0.1174*** 0.1102*** 0.083*** 0.0652** 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.034) 
Upper secondary education 0.1964*** 0.2268*** 0.1597*** 0.1659*** 0.1921*** 0.297*** 
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.021) (0.029) (0.03) (0.052) 
Vocational/Tech. training 0.4551*** 0.5453*** 0.446*** 0.4117*** 0.4396*** 0.4177*** 
 (0.026) (0.047) (0.03) (0.04) (0.032) (0.052) 
College/University 0.6746*** 0.7724*** 0.7288*** 0.6404*** 0.6084*** 0.5559*** 
 (0.029) (0.06) (0.044) (0.03) (0.041) (0.051) 
Urban 0.1208*** 0.1024** 0.1349*** 0.1163*** 0.0675** 0.0701** 
 (0.027) (0.047) (0.037) (0.032) (0.033) (0.035) 
Urban*Primary education -0.0356 -0.0215 -0.0084 -0.0338 -0.0599* -0.0336 
 (0.032) (0.058) (0.04) (0.034) (0.036) (0.056) 
Urban*Lower secondary 0.0372 0.0608 0.0206 0.0242 0.053 0.0801 
 (0.032) (0.058) (0.042) (0.041) (0.035) (0.059) 
Urban*Upper secondary 0.1317*** 0.0676** 0.0996** 0.1186** 0.1459*** 0.0973 
 (0.037) (0.035) (0.046) (0.048) (0.047) (0.081) 
Urban*Vocational or Tech. 0.0833** 0.0459 0.0674* 0.0727** 0.0137 0.0643* 
 (0.037) (0.062) (0.039) (0.038) (0.044) (0.037) 
Urban*College or University 0.1168*** 0.0836** 0.0916** 0.0977** 0.1584*** 0.2586*** 
 (0.037) (0.042) (0.046) (0.045) (0.051) (0.067) 
Government agencies 0.0429** 0.0353 0.0974*** 0.075*** 0.0925*** 0.0875*** 
 (0.02) (0.036) (0.021) (0.021) (0.028) (0.03) 
State-owned enterprises 0.1576*** 0.1166*** 0.1748*** 0.1793*** 0.1675*** 0.1633*** 
 (0.018) (0.031) (0.021) (0.02) (0.02) (0.032) 
Formal private enterprises 0.2015*** 0.2375*** 0.2282*** 0.2155*** 0.1723*** 0.1204*** 
 (0.019) (0.032) (0.026) (0.02) (0.022) (0.031) 
Medical treatment -0.034* 0.0031 -0.0182 -0.0304 -0.044** -0.0581 
 (0.021) (0.037) (0.023) (0.021) (0.019) (0.049) 
Northern Uplands -0.1716*** -0.2099*** -0.211*** -0.1899*** -0.1513*** -0.1309*** 
 (0.018) (0.027) (0.024) (0.02) (0.022) (0.034) 
Red River Delta -0.1803*** -0.2355*** -0.1917*** -0.1924*** -0.1684*** -0.1519*** 
 (0.015) (0.028) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.023) 
North Central Coast -0.1935*** -0.2626*** -0.2251*** -0.2201*** -0.1713*** -0.1247*** 
 (0.019) (0.042) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.033) 
South Central Coast -0.0404*** -0.0329 -0.0409*** -0.058*** -0.057*** -0.0674*** 
 (0.015) (0.027) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.025) 
Central Highlands 0.1783*** 0.0745** 0.0968*** 0.1634*** 0.2419*** 0.3169*** 
 (0.02) (0.034) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.036) 
Mekong River Delta -0.0015 -0.0687*** -0.0283 -0.0148 0.0262 0.0605** 
 (0.014) (0.025) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.024) 
Selection bias correction term 0.0098 0.0716*** 0.052**  -0.0482*** -0.0433** -0.0275 
 (0.015) (0.027) (0.021) (0.018) (0.021) (0.026) 
Constant 0.6902*** 0.0128 0.3927*** 0.7203*** 1.053*** 1.2699*** 
 (0.026) (0.055) (0.036) (0.033) (0.035) (0.045) 
R2/Psuedo R2 0.2967 0.1354 0.1507 0.1913 0.2085 0.1989 
Number of observations 15,202 15,202 15,202 15,202 15,202 15,202 
Notes to table A2:  
a. ***, **, and * refers to the variables of which the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at level of 0.01; 
0.05; and 0.1 respectively.  
b. Standard errors are in parentheses. The OLS standard errors are based on Huber (1967) and the quantile regression 
model estimates are based on bootstrapping with 200 replications. 
c. The specifications also include three controls for the quarters within which the interview was conducted.  
Table A3: Ethnic Minority Wage Equation 
 
 Mean 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Male worker 0.1201* 0.0585 0.0254 0.102** 0.1048* 0.0211 
 (0.063) (0.065) (0.045) (0.041) (0.059) (0.039) 
Married -0.0488 -0.0611 -0.0057 -0.0813* -0.0475 -0.0851 
 (0.044) (0.101) (0.062) (0.049) (0.063) (0.064) 
Aged from 26 to 35 0.1299*** -0.0036 0.1352** 0.1622*** 0.1394** 0.1678** 
 (0.05) (0.121) (0.062) (0.059) (0.065) (0.076) 
Aged from 36 to 45 0.1845*** 0.0061 0.1553** 0.1746*** 0.2212*** 0.264*** 
 (0.051) (0.112) (0.061) (0.066) (0.076) (0.079) 
Aged from 46 to 55 0.1974*** 0.0044 0.1172 0.2077*** 0.2473*** 0.3266*** 
 (0.057) (0.13) (0.088) (0.059) (0.076) (0.086) 
Aged from 56 to 60 0.6317*** 0.4338* 0.6195*** 0.577*** 0.5164*** 0.38 
 (0.109) (0.25) (0.134) (0.088) (0.177) (0.253) 
Primary education -0.0206 0.0098 -0.0372 0.0251 -0.028 0.1151 
 (0.06) (0.155) (0.062) (0.051) (0.065) (0.083) 
Lower secondary education 0.0423 0.0313 0.0044 0.1101 0.0279 0.1116 
 (0.089) (0.159) (0.082) (0.078) (0.072) (0.15) 
Upper secondary education 0.2187** 0.241* 0.0266 0.2002** 0.171 0.1082 
 (0.112) (0.139) (0.204) (0.084) (0.137) (0.183) 
Vocational/Tech. training 0.4365*** 0.4983** 0.3741** 0.5224*** 0.3596*** 0.3217** 
 (0.103) (0.243) (0.172) (0.094) (0.118) (0.167) 
College/University 0.6485*** 0.6068** 0.8103*** 0.6194*** 0.3981*** 0.3585** 
 (0.112) (0.284) (0.194) (0.086) (0.125) (0.182) 
Urban 0.0997** 0.0996 0.1465 0.0838** 0.1615** 0.2141** 
 (0.048) (0.252) (0.147) (0.038) (0.068) (0.108) 
Urban*Primary education 0.2807** 0.1701 0.3094* 0.2194* 0.4203*** 0.1029 
 (0.128) (0.348) (0.18) (0.123) (0.141) (0.177) 
Urban*Lower secondary 0.5398*** 0.418 0.5182*** 0.345** 0.5733*** 0.335 
 (0.138) (0.294) (0.166) (0.141) (0.185) (0.246) 
Urban*Upper secondary 0.4556*** 0.3807 0.4851* 0.3427* 0.5207** 0.7405** 
 (0.163) (0.33) (0.266) (0.184) (0.223) (0.298) 
Urban*Vocational or Tech. 0.2862** 0.0431 0.3127 0.0935 0.2827* 0.2156** 
 (0.129) (0.363) (0.216) (0.133) (0.16) (0.108) 
Urban*College or University 0.1693 0.0954 0.0384 0.0666 0.2956* 0.3901*** 
 (0.135) (0.362) (0.217) (0.151) (0.164) (0.146) 
Government agencies 0.2524*** 0.3911*** 0.2703** 0.2468*** 0.1717* 0.0099 
 (0.072) (0.141) (0.133) (0.076) (0.095) (0.105) 
State-owned enterprises 0.2047** 0.2393 0.118 0.1058 0.1476 0.2803** 
 (0.089) (0.152) (0.126) (0.089) (0.138) (0.135) 
Formal private enterprises 0.4255*** 0.5716** 0.4239*** 0.3803*** 0.2083 0.3882** 
 (0.086) (0.21) (0.137) (0.085) (0.143) (0.172) 
Medical treatment -0.0039 -0.0795 -0.0364 -0.0453 -0.0617 0.0744 
 (0.066) (0.142) (0.085) (0.063) (0.082) (0.15) 
Northern uplands -0.2143** 1.0282** -0.5535* -0.2098** -0.0609 -0.0711 
 (0.095) (-0.166) (0.297) (0.086) (0.074) (0.133) 
Red River Delta 0.3043* 1.1223*** 0.4878 0.1441 0.2264 0.4541 
 (0.177) (0.322) (0.352) (0.282) (0.278) (0.308) 
North Central Coast -0.3045* 1.0122*** -0.5132 -0.1829* -0.0343 -0.1241 
 (0.159) (-0.329) (0.388) (0.11) (0.153) (0.373) 
South Central Coast 0.1795 0.6398 0.4524 0.0198 -0.0281 -0.0166 
 (0.154) (-0.52) (0.289) (0.115) (0.151) (0.209) 
Central Highlands -0.3807*** 1.0368*** 0.6597** -0.1317 0.118 0.1821 
 (0.1) (0.207) (0.297) (0.104) (0.083) (0.158) 
Mekong River Delta -0.4671*** 1.3562*** -0.2079 -0.215** -0.1395* -0.0431 
 (0.094) (-0.179) (0.266) (0.087) (0.086) (0.146) 
Selection bias correction term -0.2371** -0.0779 -0.2032** -0.2619* -0.1597*** -0.2595*** 
 (0.108) (0.104) (0.089) (0.139) (0.058) (0.086) 
Constant 0.1383 -1.3836*** -0.3445 0.32*** 0.9666*** 1.3954*** 
 (0.129) (0.24) (0.267) (0.117) (0.141) (0.22) 
R2/Psuedo R2 0.3178 0.2012 0.2155 0.2307 0.2316 0.2005 
Number of observations 968 968 968 968 968 968 
Notes to table A3: see notes to table A2 
